Emission Abatement with Per Capita and Trade Considerations by Levy, Amnon & Livermore, Jonathon
 
University of Wollongong 











Amnon Levy  
School of Economics 





Department of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources  















University of Wollongong 
Wollongong, NSW 2522 
 
WP 09-04 




School of Economics 





Department of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources 




In the absence of a comprehensive international agreement, each country unilaterally 
sets her abatement of greenhouse gas emissions at a level that possibly maximizes her 
expected net benefit. In addition to a cleaner and healthier domestic environment and 
a slower global warming, a country’s benefit from self emission-abatement may 
include improved image and, in turn, bilateral economic and political relations. This 
paper analyses a country’s cooperative and non-cooperative emission abatements 
within a cost-benefit framework that, for equality consideration, is centered on per 
capita emission and takes international rewards for commitment to be responsive to 
per capita income and output composition.  
 
JEL Classification: Q56, F51 
  11. Introduction 
Previous studies have considered the effect of international economic relations, 
particularly trade, on greenhouse gas emissions. For example, Barrett (1997) has 
study the role of trade sanctions in deterring free riding. Using a general equilibrium 
model with a game theoretic component, Alpay (2000) has shown under which 
conditions trade can stimulate environmental protection. Eyckmans and Tulkens 
(2003) have introduced a world model for simulating cooperative game theoretic 
aspects of global climate negotiations. Most relevant to our study, Kemfert, Lise and 
Tol (2004) have focused on the question how international trade changes optimal 
emission-reduction and incentives to cooperate on emission-reduction. Their 
modelling of a country’s cost of emission-reduction has attempted to capture the 
domestic costs of self emission-reduction, the effect of international variation in the 
level of stringency of emission-reduction policy on the country’s terms of trade and 
capital flow, and the negative external effect on the country’s export of a slowing 
international economic growth that is due to foreign emission reduction. The models 
used in these studies focus on aggregate levels of domestic and foreign emissions and 
some of their assumptions hold only if the countries were identical.
1 
     Countries  differ  in  population  size,  technology, industrial structure, export of 
emission-intensive manufactured goods, and consumption level and pattern. Although 
China, and to a lesser extent India, contributes about thirty percents of the global 
atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions, the per capita emissions of this major 
workshop of highly affordable, tradable, manufactured goods are about one fifth of 
Australia (the world’s number one), the United States and Canada. These differences 
and equity are not captured by models focusing on countries’ aggregate levels of 
emissions.  
     The  cost-benefit  model  presented  in  the following sections is centered on per 
capita emission reduction. The underlying rationale is that per capita income and 
output composition influence the assessment of, and reaction to, a country’s 
commitment to emission abatement by other countries. This influence is incorporated 
into the determination of the internationally cooperative and non-cooperative emission 
reductions. The analysis reveals that when this influence is taken into account the 
                                                 
1 For instance, in Kemfert, Lise and Tol (2004) there is no external cost effect on a country via the 
terms of trade and international capital dynamics when all the countries abate the same level of 
emissions (i.e.,  0 ) ( = − j i i R R g  when  j i R R = ).  
  2non-cooperative emission reduction by some countries may exceed their optimal 
internationally cooperative abatement.  
 
 
2. A country’s costs and benefits of abatement 
The total cost for country i of reducing its per capita greenhouse gas emissions from 
the present periodical level   to   includes the full costs of enforcement of, and 
adaptation to, the new lower domestic emission level. We assume that these 
mitigation and adaptation costs (MAC) convexly rise with the country’s aggregate 
emission-abatement level:  
ˆi e i e
2 ˆ [( ) ] ii i i i MAC c e e P =−           ( 1 )  
where   denotes country i’s population and   is a positive scalar indicating the 
gradient of country i’s marginal abatement costs. We further assume that the marginal 
cost gradient declines from a maximal level   with the country’s level of 
development as some production and consumption activities are less painfully forgone 
and as technological absorptive and innovative capacities are improved. Taking per 
capita income (
i P i c
c 0 >
1 y ≥ ) as reflecting level of development, we let   be given by:  i c
/ i cc y = i
i
.            ( 2 )  
   A reduction of domestic emissions increases the health and recreational value of 
country  i’s environment for residents and foreign visitors. Due to transboundary 
externalities, this domestic environment’s appreciation ( ) also depends on the 
emissions abated by other countries. We take   to be linear (for tractability) in 
country i’s emission-abatement, 
i DEA
i DEA
ˆ () ii ee P − , and in each of her j ( ) 
counterpart’s emissions abatement, 
N i j ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 = ≠
ˆ () j jj P ee − . The average external effect of any 
country j’s emission-abatement on   depends on the directional alignment of i 
and j with dominant winds, on the distance between i and j and on the structure of the 
surface separating i from j. Due to these intervening factors, the average external 
effect (
i DEA
0 ji β ≥ ) is likely to be smaller than the average internal effect ( 0 i α > ) of i’s 
emission abatement. With 
exp
j e  denoting country i’s expectations about any country 
j’s per capita emissions, country i’s expected domestic environment’s appreciation is: 
exp ˆˆ () () ( )
N
ii i i i j i j j
ji
ED E A e e P e e P αβ
≠
=− + − ∑ j .        ( 3 )  
  3    By reducing her emissions, country i also
effort of moderating the global accumulation of greenhouse gases and, in turn, global 
⎥ ⎦
where 
 contributes to the aggregate international 
warming. We take country i’s expected benefit (in nominal units) from a moderated 
global warming (MGW) to be given by: 
exp ˆˆ () ( )( )
N
ii i i i j j
ji
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country i from the aggregate effort to moderate global warming.   
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     As  her  countries’  environment and terms of trade depend on country i’s 
commitment to emission reduction, there are international benefits to co
impressing her counterparts of being environmentally responsible and non-
opportunistic trading partner. Yet country i cannot equally impress all her 
counterparts. A less committed country may regard country i as an environmentally 
responsible and non-opportunistic trading partner, whereas a more committed country 
may deem country i an environmentally irresponsible and opportunistic trading 
partner. Hence, country i may economically and politically be rewarded by the 
former, but sanctioned by the latter. As a higher degree of tolerance is likely revealed 
toward a low-income country producing tradable goods, the sanctions and rewards 
may be responsive to the portion of the per capita income generated by export 
oriented industries. We therefore assume that country i expects her economic and 
political relations with any other country to change with the relative stringency of 
their non-export income deflated emission-abatement policies. More specifically, we 
assume that country i expects the loss (in nominal units) of relations with country j to 
diminish from a maximal level 
max 0 ji LR ≥  with her ratio of per capita abatement to 
per capita non-export income, relative to that of country j. The maximal loss depends 
on the nature of the initial relation e size and international influence of i and j. 
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The scalar   denotes country i’s non-ex
and   indicate, respectively, country i’s perception of country 
0 1 i s ≤≤
exp)/ jj ee
port income share. The scalars  0 ji r ≥  
ˆ 1/[( ] 0 j j s y −≥
  4j’s ability and inclination to reward country i’s commitment to per capita do  
emission-reduction with m re favorable economic and political relations. A negative 
i
(sanctioned) for her relatively strong (weak) commitment to emission abatement with 
higher (lower) level of economic and political international cooperation. 
( i ENB ) from reducing her greenhouse-gas emissions is: 
mestic
o
(positive)  reflects country i’s overall expectation to be rewarded 
     In  view  costs and expected benefits, country i’s expected net benefit 
 ( ) EA L I R
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   .(7) 
Country i al abatement rises with her own 
ma proved domestic environments and moderated global 
warm proved international relations, but diminishes with the 
and counterparts’ 
erosion of her counterparts’ relative abatement and subsequent bilateral relations with 
her. It also decreases with the gradient of country i’s marginal costs of abatement. 
  5Though not a close-form solution of equation (7), it is useful for a comparison with 
the non-cooperative emission abatement to express country i’s cooperatively optimal 
per capita emission abatement as:  
2
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     In the absence of cooperation, each country maximizes her individual expected net 










b  fr i e ENB i i e − ˆ , there exists an 
interior  ENB e e max arg ˆ * = − . It equates country i’s marginal expected self benefit 
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Consequently, for every country  N 1,2,3,..., i =  the non-cooperative expected net 
benefit maximizing abatement of per capita emissions is equal to the ratio of the sum 
 the improvem of her own marginal benefits from ents in her domestic environment, 


























.                     (10) 
     Suppose  that  i is a large manufacturing country of highly affordab
goods. If the rest of the countries are expected, despite being less intensive workshops 
b
country  i is mainly determined by her domestic and g elf 
le, tradable 
of affordable and tradable goods, to be weakly committed to emission-abatement, 
their aggregate ability and inclination to reward country i (
exp ˆ /[( )/ ]
N
ji j j j j
ji
re e s y
≠
− ∑ ) is 
perceived by country i to be low. Consequently, the per cap y 
interests and is smaller than the cooperatively optimal level. Moreover, selfishness 
might lead to power abuse. A large producer i of highly affordable and exportable 
goods, who is also capable of inflicting a large punishment 
max
ij LR  on any other 
ita emissions abated 
lobal environmental s
  6country  j and who strongly evaluates her own benefit fro proved global 
environment (i.e., has a large  i
m im
γ ), might coerce other countries into abating greater 
quantities of emissions than the cooperatively optimal ones by adhering to an 
inflexible punitive policy (low  ij r ). The possibility that for some countries the non-
cooperative expected net benefit maximizing abatement of per capita emissions is 














(/ ) 1 ˆ (/ ) ( )





ji i i o
ij i i j j j j o
ji ji jj i i
rs s y
s y





⎫ ⎪ + ⎬
⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ +− ⎨⎬
−− ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
∑∑ =
    
then   } .  (Straightforward from equations (8) and (10).)   
. Cournot-Nash equilibrium  concluding remarks 
batement levels are perfect 
(
N
ii j P βγ

















If each country’s expectations about the other countries’ a
(
* exp
j j e e = ), the solution of the N equation-system (10) is the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium of the N countries’ emission-abatement levels. In order to shed light on 
the properties of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium levels of abatement, the analytically 
tractable case of a world divided into two alliances is considered (e.g., an alliance of 
poor workshop countries of tradable primary and manufactured goods versus the rest 
of the world). In this case, the expected-net-benefit maximizing per capita emissions 
are 
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for alliance 2. The solution to this sy m of reaction equations yields the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium per capita emission-abatement for alliance 1: 
()
ste
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The quantity and properties of   are obtained by symmetry.  
 rises  ent in its own 
*
22 ˆ () ee −
Equation (13) reveals that in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the per capita emission 
abated by alliance 1 
* ˆ () ee − with the marginal improvem 11
environment generated by its own abatement ( 1 α ), with its marginal benefit from the 
combined effort of curbing global warming ( 1 γ ), with alliance 2’s ability to reward 
commitment weighted by its relative non-export per capita income ( (/ ) rs ys y) 
and with alliance 2’s marginal abatement costs’ gradient ( / cc y
21 2 2 1 1
22 = ). In the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, alliance 1’s per capita emission-abatement decline n 
marginal abatement costs’ gradient ( 11 / cc y
s with its ow
= ) and with th
( 1 P ).  In order to assess the effect of alliance 1’s ability to reward alliance 2 and the 
effect of alliance 2’s population siz ance 1’s emission-abatement level in a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium note that 
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where   is the discriminant (the square of the second term on the right hand side) 





1 P o very small, 
1 1 1 [1 2( ) /(( / ) )] 0 cyP α γ
e with
−+ > . In which case, the per capita emissions abated by 
alliance 1 in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium rise with the popula on of alliance 2 and 
ity to reward alliance 2 ( 12 r ). The emission-abatement 
ti
declin  alliance 1’s abil
  8moderating effect of the latter factor is increased by alliance 1’s relative non-export 
per capita income  11 22 (/ ) sy sy . Recalling that 
*
11 2 1 2 2 1 1 ˆ ( ) [( )/( )]} 0 ee rs y s y / { ∂ −∂ > , the 
total effect of alliance 1’s relative non-export per capita income  11 22 (/ ) sy sy  on 
alliance 1’s emissio  is negative.  
     
n reduction
  9Appendix: The Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
Recall (11), (12) and (2),  
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.                    (A2) 
Let  11 1 θ αγ ≡+ ,  22 2 θ αγ ≡+ ,  11 1 y sy =   and  22 2 y sy =   and substitute the right hand 
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In turn, 
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By rearranging terms, 
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and, consequently, 
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The roots of (A6) are: 
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As the discriminant in (A7) is positive and larger than the absolute value of the 
coefficient of   in (A6), only the following root is considered to be relevant: 
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